Designing Microﬁnance from
an Exit-Strategy Perspective
by Larry Hendricks
Abstract: In bilateral microfinance projects, exit strategies or “hand over” phases
generally have not proven very successful. Institutions, groups, or processes
designed with the sole purpose of implementing microfinance projects, to the
exclusion of promoting postproject sustainability, tend to develop vulnerabilities that lead to their programs’ failure. To counter this problem, China’s
Chongqing Comprehensive Poverty Alleviation Project (CCPAP) takes a different tack, designing an exit-strategy approach into its microfinance program from
the outset. While still in the design phase, this approach has raised several critical issues that must be resolved, and these comprise the main focus of this paper.

Introduction

I

t is said that if you make a prenuptial agreement—an exit
strategy—before you get married, you expect the marriage
to fail. This may or may not be true in marriage. However,
in many microfinance programs, past failures to build proper
exit strategies into their designs from the onset have, arguably,
caused problems.
Unlike some Non-Government Organization (NGO) projects, bilateral donor projects tend to have relatively short lives
of four to five years. Therefore, the donors’ short-term involvement in the program and the short-term implementation of the
project create limiting conditions and serious constraints,
not faced by those who can take longer-term perspectives on
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institution building. In its short four-to-five-year time frame, a
bilateral donor project is expected to design a microfinance
institution or program, to build the necessary capacity, and,
when the project ends, to have established an operation that
has developed enough momentum to achieve financial sustainability on its own.
That this tight time frame may pose challenges has been
recognized elsewhere already. A recent U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) evaluation of a businessfocused NGO (2001) noted a need to bridge a development gap
between building sufficient capacity and acknowledging evidence of conditions that must exist for a program to meet the
needs of both development and secure investment standards.
This lesson was underlined recently in the Australian
Agency for International Development’s (AusAID) Qinghai
Community Development Project, implemented in China by
Australian managing contractor Hassall and Associates
International, where an end-of-project exit strategy was
addressed only after two years of development. But as the subsequent evaluation, in its “Lessons Learned” section, stated,
“the ultimate aim of a microfinance intervention is to ensure
that after the donor’s withdrawal the microfinance organization created will become autonomous and capable of achieving
financial self-sufficiency without further external assistance”
(2001, Section 2.3).
Although the Qinghai Community Development Project
had tried to establish a sound, long-term, sustainable microfinance model, its efforts were insufficient on several fronts. Its
internal monitoring and governance structure was not institutionalized adequately to carry on after the project ended.
Momentum built by the project during its life had created
neither the necessary infrastructure nor a sound enough governance base to carry it across the aforementioned gap, so that it
could operate at standards required to obtain a secure external
Larry Hendricks is microﬁnance specialist with CCPAP and senior consultant and
manager of Henricks & Associates. Email: henricks@sympatico.ca

78

Volume 5 Number 1

Microfinance from an Exit-Strategy Perspective

capital investment. As a result, a follow-on project had to be
designed to assist the program to become sustainable.
When a subsequent AusAID effort, the Chongqing
Comprehensive Poverty Alleviation Project (CCPAP), was
modelled upon Qinghai, the original project design document
likewise did not discuss implementing any exit strategy until
the project’s last year. At that time the designers foresaw the
need for a “hand over” phase. But in its proposal to AusAID,
the same managing contractor, remembering the Qinghai
experience, pointed out, “it will be important early in the project to develop an exit strategy.” This brief statement led the
microfinance team to consider an entire new approach to the
exit strategy in Chongqing.

Background
CCPAP is just getting underway under the auspices of
AusAID. It is an integrated poverty alleviation project with
components that include road and water system construction,
income diversification, and microfinance. The project targets
women in poor households, in poor villages, in poor townships in five national autonomous counties. All project components have a mandate for sustainability. For example, the
road and water system construction component includes a
mandate to train and prepare communities for the ongoing
operation and maintenance of those systems. Income diversification training will prepare clients to use microfinance loans
and to sustain new enterprises beyond the life of the project.
The microfinance program has a mandate to ensure that it,
itself, becomes sustainable and beyond that helps to sustain all
other project interventions.
The Australian managing contractor, in attempting to
implement the lessons learned in Qinghai and elsewhere in
China, is applying these lessons rigorously to the development
and operation of the CCPAP microfinance program in two
ways.
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First, the contractor is applying the lessons relating to
microfinance by documenting how the application is taking
place. Where the situation differs enough that a lesson cannot
be applied as intended, an explanation of the differences is also
being documented.
Second, and more pertinent here, is the exit strategy.
Instead of waiting until nearly the end of the project to begin
considering an exit strategy, the CCPAP microfinance program is, from the beginning, being designed and implemented
in the sure knowledge that the project ends in four years.
Unsurprisingly, this has already had a large impact on the program’s design, even though, at this writing, the microfinance
program is less than two months into development. Already,
the microfinance team has learned that it must address several
lessons from the emerging issues. The most important of these
are listed below.

The Issues to Address
A microfinance program cannot and should not count on a
donor continuing to support it after the end of the project.
That is, if a donor intended to continue support, it would have
designed the project differently from the outset.
Considering a microfinance program’s design from an endof-project perspective demonstrates the importance of filtering
all design decisions, putting every element of the program to
the following test: Will this program continue to exist without
project staff pushing it, and without project money to support it?
Will it be sustainable in its own right?
There are three major elements to every microfinance
program, and each must be tested against this filter. They are
(a) Management and Monitoring, (b) Management Information
Systems (MIS), and (c) Field Delivery Resources. Each is
addressed below in more detail.
Because CCPAP ends in four years, it is critical to assess
each aspect of the microfinance program in terms of its contribution to sustainability. The consequence of applying this
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assessment filter to the design of a microfinance operation
focuses more on other aspects of the program than on operational and financial sustainability. This filter adds several
dimensions to the project’s design, one of which is to develop
a local sense of ownership right from the outset, rather than
waiting until the project’s last year to consider the hand over
phase.
In an integrated poverty alleviation project, project team
members must make hard decisions about which aspects of
many project components contribute to microfinance sustainability. Participants must make a clear distinction between the
outcomes of community participation, training, and income
diversification activities, and the possible contributions of
these outcomes to a sustainable exit-strategy-oriented microfinance program. 1 This distinction becomes very important
when groups formed at the village level begin to discuss
income diversification. Should these groups also be given a role
in the microfinance program? The exit-strategy approach dictates that the answer must be “no,” unless the groups preexisted the project and could add value, for example, by adding
the screening of loan applications to such work as they carry
out already. Making decisions about such situations has the
potential to put project team members at odds, unless communication between them remains open and active and unless all
of them accept the need for sustainability in each of the three
major program elements. Following are some factors affecting
the decision process in Chongqing.

Management and Monitoring
In China, microfinance programs usually must work in partnership with organizations licensed by the People’s Bank
of China, a requirement that creates simultaneous opportunities and challenges. On one hand, in China as in most countries, few commercial banks are interested in working with
microfinance programs. On the other hand, if a microfinance
program can prove itself to a commercial bank, bank enthusiasm and support may assist the microfinance program’s
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marketing, reach, and sustainability. Also, if the bank recognizes the available marketing opportunity, it may use the
microfinance program as a lever, to position itself to gain an
edge in the increasingly competitive Chinese banking industry.
Sometimes a combination of these circumstances may occur.
Analysis of other microfinance programs indicates that in
most, the contractor or donor agency has controlled the management directly or formed a new board of management and
controlled it indirectly. When forming a new board, participant selection is usually based on the local applicants’ positions
relative to the project and so give more weight to officials in
local government and projects. Once selected, this board of
management theoretically is trained to manage the microfinance program. Unfortunately local participants often follow
the project contractor or donor’s lead, and so never really
learn to lead the program themselves.
From an exit-strategy perspective, this management
approach is not viable. It severely limits the ability of a microfinance program to sustain itself after the project to establish it
ends, in at least three ways. First, the contractor or donor disappears at the end of the project. Second, the financial support
is no longer available and in most cases the value that a
continuing successful microfinance program would have contributed does not exist or has not been cultivated enough.
Third, if the board of management does continue, it has
problems because it has gained no real experience leading the
program.
Applying the sustainability filter to CCPAP’s design
helped the microfinance team to determine that the project
could not create a new board of management for the program,
because its sustainability after the project ended could not be
guaranteed. CCPAP therefore decided that it had to build on
an existing local management structure and has made this
approach a mainstay of the program’s design.
Instead of creating an entirely new board of management to act as a governing body, CCPAP chose to ask each
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autonomous county government to nominate an existing local
group already interested in poverty alleviation and microfinance. This strategy anticipates that the county Poverty
Alleviation Leading Group will be nominated in each county.
This county leading group, led by a vice-governor, currently is
responsible for the local administration of China’s National
Poverty Alleviation Fund Program. There is a risk that not all
of these leading groups may comprise the best people.
However, more importantly, it is likely that the groups will
continue after the project ends, at least until the National
Poverty Alleviation Fund Program winds down.
Besides administering the type of “best practices,” capacitybuilding exercise normal in similar projects with microfinance
components, the contractor here recognizes that it must also
train leading group members to acknowledge and accept three
additional factors. The first of these is the benefit to the poor
of a sustainable design for the CCPAP microfinance program
rather than subsidized program. The second is that information yielded by high-quality microfinance performance data
benefits board members’ everyday work in local government.
The third is that a sustainable microfinance program
can reduce poverty and make each participating county
more competitive on national and international markets. Time
will determine whether the third objective is achievable.
However, CCPAP will make every effort to help translate
its microfinance performance data into a form that can contribute to local development, reduce poverty, and increase
local competitiveness.

Management Information Systems (MIS)
Many microfinance loan tracking and performance measurement software packages exist on the commercial market. Most
meet the standards of the Consultative Group for Assisting the
Poorest (CGAP) and are suitable for stand-alone microfinance
programs.
As stated earlier, most bilateral microfinance projects in
China must be implemented through a licensed organization.
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As also stated earlier, CCPAP has decided that it must graft
itself onto the existing structure of a licensed microfinance
provider. Thus extensive participatory consultation with
relevant stakeholders in each of the five counties where the
project will operate led CCPAP to decide upon Rural Credit
Cooperatives (RCCs), which are formal, licensed microfinance
providers, as recipients of AusAID funds for on-lending.
Where possible, CCPAP will use existing MIS and baseline
information collected by these RCCs, not adding any new
requirements unless a significant gap can be demonstrated in
the information necessary for the CCPAP program. Existing
performance reports will be used where possible. Any augmented reporting will be achieved by generating new reports
on current RCC systems. This process allows the project to
generate best-practice performance information and also to
audit its program. In this way the project will enhance existing
RCC systems, building on them to demonstrate how the same
information accumulated for their entire current operations
will both add value and contribute to more effective management overall.
With China entering the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the People’s Bank of China is implementing a significant series of financial reforms. Consistent with the
exit-strategy philosophy, CCPAP has determined that implementing Western accounting standards for its whole microfinance program would not be cost effective. Instead, except
for the addition of installment-based delinquency reporting,
Chinese accounting standards will be used. This will reduce
confusion and will allow the normal course of financial-reform
events to deal with other differences in accounting standards.
The exit-strategy perspective dictates that any other approach
would not be sustainable.
CCPAP’s project team believes that this approach should
reduce costs in its own microfinance operation while building
capacity in existing Chinese institutions. In any event,
this method clearly holds more opportunity for long-term
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sustainability than does instituting an MIS that would operate
in parallel with the RCCs’ current banking and MIS systems.
A stand-alone, specialized microfinance MIS could be easily
discarded after CCPAP ends, but integrating performance
reporting with existing local systems would make it less susceptible to abandonment.

Field Delivery Resources
RCCs have been recommended and accepted as the preferred
licensed institutions for the microfinance program, partly
because they have by far the most extensive township-level network of any Chinese financial institution. However, CCPAP’s
planners had envisioned that the All China Women’s
Federation (ACWF) would also play a significant role in the
project. Assuming a solidarity group delivery model, part of
that role would have involved the ACWF in the formation of
borrowers’ groups. Difficulties with this approach include the
ACWF’s small operating budget and consequently the very
low salaries it pays to its village-level representatives. In fairness, if they were recruited by CCPAP, the program should
also pay them for their services. Unfortunately, from an exitstrategy perspective, paying ACWF representatives to facilitate
forming borrowers’ groups is not sustainable, especially compared with the more efficient approach of using the RCC’s
extensive network. Because the project’s primary beneficiaries
are women, this situation has caused CCPAP staff much concern. However, the project design provides for training and
building capacity among ACWF representatives—the contractor team is exploring ways to help them become facilitators
and to sell their services locally as community development
consultants.
Skills with a repeat or referral market value that ACWF representatives could provide include the following: facilitating
development of village plans; developing business plans; forming loan groups; selling their services for preparing loan applications, as literate people who know the microfinance system’s
workings; mediating community and family conflicts; and
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providing access to market information. The project microfinance team believes that if ACWF representatives are credible in the villages they represent, then charging small fees for
their services outside their ACWF responsibilities will be
acceptable. Such additional fees would supplement meager
membership fees currently paid by households in these facilitators’ ACWF territories and so increase their incomes.
Helping ACWF village representatives become facilitators
would solve the project’s group facilitation problem in a sustainable way and provide them with opportunities to improve
their livelihoods as village facilitators, with potential to make
significant favourable impacts on their communities’ marketing competitiveness.
CCPAP recognizes that it has based this proposed solution
on three major assumptions. The first is that ACWF representatives would want to become facilitators. The second is that
villagers would be willing to pay them extra for their new services, rather than considering these offerings as part of their
ACWF jobs. The third is that the training CCPAP would provide them would be effective enough to raise their capacities
and make their new skills saleable. Even recognizing these
assumptions, however, the microfinance team thinks it best to
try this innovative method to achieve sustainability. Not to do
so would increase the project’s vulnerability to long-term failure, by increasing the likelihood that the basic foundations of
the program’s structure could not be financed after the project
was complete.

Lessons and Conclusions
The exit-strategy approach requires that the microfinance team
undertake both a serious evaluation of what already exists
onsite and an equally serious assessment of whether project
involvement can be built upon an existing structure or process,
to add evident value to that structure’s operation. These assessments must involve designing an effective capacity-building
program that strengthens any existing provider’s operation.
86

Volume 5 Number 1

Microfinance from an Exit-Strategy Perspective

Importantly, the exit-strategy approach also requires the team
to gain a sound knowledge of the other components of a multifaceted project such as CCPAP.
It is evident that single-purpose groups, such as boards of
management created solely to implement projects, actually
pose a threat to those projects’ sustainability. These created
groups are, in reality, weak points that make microfinance programs vulnerable to collapse after the projects that have established them draw to an end. To counter this threat, CCPAP
will establish a joint venture or strategic alliance between local
governments and RCCs to deliver small loans to poor farmers
interested in diversifying their incomes. The local governments
form the boards of management and the RCCs are the program
providers.
Most microfinance program designers think in terms of
creating new stand-alone institutions. The consequences of
adopting the exit-strategy approach are radically different.
Instead of establishing a microfinance institution, CCPAP
effectively uses microfinance principles to help the existing
RCC institution establish a new product line with associated
capacity, which it can market to current and future clients.
This is a significant shift from current thought on microfinance. Consequently, some microfinance specialists are having difficulty grasping and accepting it as a workable
alternative to the traditional microfinance institution.
However, CCPAP’s microfinance team feels that a properly rigorous evaluation of the situation leads straight to difficult decisions and to facing their consequences. Put another
way, the only way to avoid making the hard decisions necessary
to implement a good exit strategy is to avoid rigorous evaluation altogether. In the short term, avoiding these decisions
would perhaps help team members avoid confrontations—but
only to the long-term disadvantage of the program’s would-be
beneficiaries. Thus, with the exit-strategy approach, the team
cannot avoid hard decisions. However difficult, the Chongqing
Comprehensive Poverty Alleviation Project’s team is making
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the choices the approach demands. Time will prove whether its
decisions are correct and the approach is valid.

Notes
The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent those of
either Hassall & Associates International or AusAID.
1. In some ways this argument parallels the discussions among participants
in online microfinance discussion groups regarding the separation of microfinance operations from Business Development Service.
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